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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is aimed to know the factors that affect the quality of audits 
on non financial companies in Indonesia. This study uses the financial 
statement of non financial companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) for period of 2013-2014. Data collection method used 
in  this   research  is   purposive  sampling   with   31   non   financial 
companies as the sample. The hypotheses were tested using logistic 
regression analysis. The results show that the variables that have a 
significant effect on audit quality is a measure of independent board. 
While other variables examined in this study such as Institutional 
Ownership is  not proven to affect on audit quality. 
Keywords: Managerial Ownership, size independent board, audit 
committee size and audit quality 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Audit service is very important to increase financial statement users’ trust in 
the financial report. This service will give added value to the financial statement, in 
which  users apply  this  information for decision making. Therefore, it is important 
to improve the audit quality. Auditors should keep and improve  the  independence, 
competency  and accountability in conducting their  engagement,  so that  the audit 
qualiy increases.  An independent audit provides a necessary external check on the 
integrity of financial statements.  Auditor’s independence is important in the context 
of  audit  quality  because  the  independent  audit  is  critical  to  the  credibility  and 
integrity of financial statements (Treasury, 2010). Because of the important result of 
an audit process, the auditor  must  maintain  quality in accordance with the generally 
accepted auditing  standard (GAAS) when accumulating and evaluating  the auditing 
evidence.  The auditor is encouraged to have accountability on each part of an  audit 
activity.   Therefore, the purpose of   an audit activity needs   sufficient competent 
evidences so that it can run successfully (Suyono, 2013). 
According to  the  Cadbury Report (1992), the annual audit is “one of the 
cornerstones of corporate governance. The audit provides an external and objective 
check  on  the  way  in  which  the  financial  statements  have  been  prepared  and 
presented.” But the effectiveness and efficiency of external auditing is subject to the 
actuality and the development of  the  corporate governance environment (Holm and 
Laursen,  2007). 
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There are several corporate governance factors that affect audit quality, 
including the ownership structure, independence of board directors and independence 
of audit committee. It seems that the ownership structure creates several stimuli to 
supervise the financial reporting and affect the independent auditor. One stimulus is 
that the audited financial statements are an important resource for information about 
the company and the investors value it significantly in analyzing the accounting 
information and financial decision makings about auditing quality and the type of the 
auditors'  reports.  Thus,  it  is  expected  that  the  companies'  ownership  potentially 
affects auditing quality and there is a logical relationship between the amount of these 
ownerships and auditing quality (Hoseinbeglou et al, 2013). 
The relationship between outside shareholders and managers is marked by 
moral hazard and opportunism, which result from information asymmetry. The social 
role of financial reporting increases with the separation of ownership and control 
(Wan, et al. 2008). The percentage of ownership from institution is normally higher 
than individual investor. It is assumed that institutional investors have more influence 
than other individual investors. With the high portion of ownership, institutional 
ownership has the importance of monitoring role in the process auditing. Kane and 
Velury (2002) observed that the greater the level of institutional ownership, the more 
likely it is that a firm purchases audit services from large audit firm in order to ensure 
high audit quality (Adeyemi and Fagbemi, 2010). 
According Chtourou et al (2001) that the greater the number of board 
monitoring, the better the mechanism of enterprise management. The proportion of 
Commissioners from outside the company or independent Commissioners also affect 
the performance of the company acting as a mediator in disputes between internal 
managers and oversee the management policies as well as providing advices to the 
management independent. Commissioner is best positioned to implement the 
monitoring function to create a company that good corporate governance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and 
audit quality is mixed. For examples, O'Sullivan (2000) uses audit fees as a surrogate 
for audit quality to examine the impact of board composition and ownership structure 
on audit quality in the UK prior to the adoption of the recommendations of the 
Cadbury Committee. His findings suggest that audit fees have a positive correlation 
with the proportion of non-executive directors and a negative association with the 
proportion  of  equity  owned  by  executive  directors,  but  have  no  impact  with 
ownership by large institutional blockholders or CEO/chairman duality. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the factors from corporate governance 
that determine the audit quality of non financial companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The analysis was done by examining the influence of ownership structure 
and board of directors on audit quality. Therefore, there were two research questions 
in this study: does managerial ownership have influence on audit quality and does 
independence of board commissioners have influence on audit quality. 
 
The Relation of Managerial Ownership with Audit Quality 
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The inappropriate and insufficient revealing of financial reports and the lack 
of information transparency in companies increase the problems resulted from 
ownership isolations from the management. The lack of presenting the related and 
reliable financial information results in economic losses for stockholders and other 
external  beneficiaries  (Hoseinbeglou  et  al.  2013).  Additionally,  the  investors, 
creditors and other beneficiaries rely on the results of auditing carried out by the 
independent auditing institutions. The more auditing quality will result in more value, 
credibility and acceptability of it by the users of financial statements. On the other 
hand, auditing quality which is directly related with corporate governance and 
controlling strategies has a hidden and multi-dimensional structure (Hoseinbeglou et 
al. 2013). 
H1 = Managerial Ownership has a positive effect on audit quality. 
 
The Relation of Independence Board Commissioners with Audit Quality 
Commissioner is an independent entity within the company which usually 
consists of an independent board of directors from outside the company and serves to 
assess the overall performance of the company extensively (Emirzon, 2007). 
Independent commissioner of a company must be truly independent and able to resist 
the  influence,  intervention,  and  pressure  from  major  shareholders  who  have  an 
interest in the transaction or purpose (Ahmad, 2005). As part of the monitoring organ, 
independent commissioners are expected to have full attention and commitment in 
carrying out their duties and obligations. Independent commissioner aims to balance 
in   decision-making   especially  in   the   context   of   the   protection   of   minority 
shareholders and other parties concerned. If the company has an independent 
commissioner, the financial statements presented by the management tend to be more 
integrated, because there is the body within a company that oversees and protects the 
rights of the parties outside the company’s management. The more the number of 
independent board, the better the performance of supervisory and coordination 
functions within the company. This will affect the level of oversight of auditors and 
the better the quality of financial reports produced and delivered to the users, 
especially shareholders. Some companies concluded that the Independent board of 
commissioner will extend on the audit process and improve audit quality. 
H2 = Independence Board of Commissioners has a positive effect on audit quality. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data  in  this  study  is  taken  from  financial  statements  or  annual  reports 
obtained from Indonesian Capital Market Directory 2013—2014 and www.idx.co.id. 
The data used in this study was secondary data obtained and recorded by another 
party. The data included all variables such as ownership structure, board of directors, 
and audit report statement. 
To obtain the data, documentation, ie obtaining data of a document emanating 
from the financial statements and www.idx.co.id ICMD (Indonesia Capital Market 
Directory) was conducted. The samples were selected based on purposive judgment 
sampling method. Thus, the sample in this study must meet the criteria: the company 
had successively been listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013 and 2014, the 
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Table 1. Coefficients between Variables 
 
company had published its financial statements closing date December 31 in 2013 
and 2014 and the financial statements in the sample has been audited by The Public 
Accountant. 
In this study, researchers will use the dependent variable and independent 
variables. The dependent variable is audit quality. The independent variables in this 
study include: managerial ownership (the proportion of ownership of shares held by 
managers  and  employees  in  the  company)  which  is  formulated  as  own  =  Σ 
presentation of the ownership of the shares owned by the company's employees and 
managerial and Independence Board Commissioners (the percentage ratio between 
the numbers of Commissioners from outside the company (independent 
Commissioners) to the total number of board members of the company). 
In this study, quantitative analysis was done by quantifying research data to 
produce information needed in the analysis. Analysis tools used in this study was 
logistic regression analysis (logistic regression) because the independent variable is a 
mixture between continuous variables (metrics) and categorical (non-metric) which 
does not need the assumption of normality of the data on the independent variables. 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity  test  aims  to  test  whether  the  regression  model  found 
correlations between variables (independent). 
 
Coefficient Correlation sa 
 
Model INAC OS IBOC 
Correlations      INAC 
OS 
IBOC 
1.000 
-.030 
.077 
-.030 
1.000 
-.037 
.077 
-.037 
1.000 
1 
Covariances     INAC 
OS 
IBOC 
.009 
-.001 
.000 
-.001 
.172 
-.001 
.000 
-.001 
.002 
a. Dependent Variable: AQ 
Source: Secondary data were processed, 2014 
 
The results of the correlation between variables shows that the only 
independent variable) which possessed high  correlation  is Managerial Ownership 
(OS) with a correlation of 17.2%. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing using logistic regression models was to examine the effect 
of the Managerial Ownership (OS) and Independent Commissioner (IBOC) which 
affect on Audit Quality (AQ). Testing hypotheses include (1) assess the feasibility of 
the regression model, (2) assess the overall model, and (3) test the regression 
coefficients. 
 
Testing of the regression coefficients 
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The final stage is the regression coefficient test, in which the results can be seen 
in Table 4.11 The table shows the results of the logistic regression test with a 
significance level of 5 percent. 
Table 7. 
Logistic Regression Coefficients Test Results 
 
V ariables in the Equation 
 
95.0% C.I.for EXP(B) 
 
 
B 
 
S.E. 
 
Wald 
 
df 
 
Sig. 
 
Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Satep      OS 
1            IBOC 
INAC 
Constant 
-.892 
.653 
-.979 
-.481 
2.037 
.233 
.526 
1.630 
.191 
7.880 
3.467 
.087 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.662 
.005 
.063 
.768 
.410 
1.922 
.376 
.618 
.008 
1.218 
.134 
22.236 
3.033 
1.053 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: OS, IBOC, INAC. 
 
Source: Secondary data were processed, 2014 
 
From  the  results  of  the  regression  analysis,  there  is  one  variable  that 
significantly influences the dependent variable. It is Independent Commissioner 
(IBOC). This is proven by the level of significance less than 0.05. There is one 
variable  that  has  no  significant  influence  on  the  dependent  variable.  That  is 
Managerial Ownership (OS). This is evidenced by the level of significance obtained 
independent variables are more than 0.05 
Results of significance testing in partial independent variables as in the 
discussion as follows: 
1. H1: Managerial Ownership has a positive affect on audit quality 
Managerial Ownership (OS) variable shows a negative coefficient of -0.892 with 
variable probability of 0.662 above the 0.05 level (5 percent). Thus it can be 
concluded that H1 is rejected. Thus no evidence that Managerial Ownership (OS) 
affects the Audit Quality (AQ). 
2. H2: Independence Board of Commissioners  has a positive affect on audit quality 
Independent  Commissioner  (IBOC)  variable  shows  the  positive  coefficient  of 
0.653 with variable probability of 0.005 under the 0.05 level (5 percent). Meaning 
it can be concluded that the H2 is accepted. Thus evident that there is a positive 
effect of the Independent Commissioner (IBOC) on the Audit Quality (AQ). 
 
Table 8. Resume Results Of Hypothesis 
No Hypothesis Result Conclusion 
1. H1: Managerial Ownership has 
a positive affect on audit 
quality. 
B = -0.892 
sign (0.662) > 0.05 
Rejected 
2. H2: Independence Board of 
Commissioners has a positive 
affect on audit quality. 
B = 0.653 
sign (0.005) < 0.05 
Accepted 
Source: Secondary data were processed, 2014 
 
DISCUSSION 
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Managerial Ownership (OS) Variable 
In this study, the Managerial Ownership (OS) hypothesized that the greater 
the Managerial Ownership (OS) of the company, the greater Audit Quality  and vice 
versa. The results showed that the testing of the hypothesis (H1) which states that 
Ownership Structure has a positive effect on audit quality is not significantly 
acceptable. Descriptive statistical analysis of the results showed that the lowest 
(minimum) Managerial Ownership (OS) is 0.00 and the highest (maximum) 0.65, 
then the average Managerial Ownership (OS) is 0.0634 while the standard deviation 
is  0.11327.  The  results  indicate  that  the  greater  primary value  than  the  average 
Managerial Ownership (OS) indicates that the value of the proportion of ownership of 
shares held by managers and employees in the company is far different. 
The finding does  not  support  the  agency theory which  mentions  that  the 
inappropriate  and  insufficient  revealing  of  financial  reports  and  the  lack  of 
information   transparency   in   companies   increase   the   problems   resulted   from 
ownership isolations from the management. The lack of presenting the related and 
reliable financial information, results in economic losses for stockholders and other 
external beneficiaries. 
The finding also was not consistent with previous research. The previous 
research such as conducted by Hoseinbeglou et al. (2013) who concluded that the 
independent  auditing  supports  the  rights  of  all  beneficiaries  through  crediting 
financial statements, guaranteeing reliability and approving financial information 
quality. On the other hand, auditing quality which is directly related with corporate 
governance and controlling strategies has a hidden and multi-dimensional structure. 
 
Independent Commissioner (IBOC) Variable 
In this study, the Independent Commissioner (IBOC) hypothesized that the 
greater the Independent Commissioner (IBOC) of the company, the greater audit 
quality and vice versa. The results showed that the testing of the hypothesis (H2) 
which states that Independence Board of Commissioner has a positive effect on audit 
quality  is  significantly  acceptable.  Descriptive  statistical  analysis  of  the  results 
showed that the lowest value (minimum) of Independent Commissioner (IBOC) is 
3.00 and the highest (maximum) is 6.00, then the average of Independent 
Commissioner (IBOC)  is 3.9247 while the standard deviation is 1.04504. Similarly, 
the minimum value smaller than the average (3.00), and the maximum value smaller 
than the average value (6.00) indicate that the Independent Commissioner (IBOC) of 
variable data indicates a favorable outcome. 
The finding supports the agency theory.   The proportion of Commissioners 
from outside the company or independent Commissioners also affect the performance 
of the company acting as a mediator in disputes between internal managers and 
oversee the management policies as well as providing advices to the management 
independent. Commissioner is best positioned to implement the monitoring function 
to create a company that good corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Conclusion 
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Based on test results and discussion on the influence of the the Managerial 
Ownership (OS) and Independent Commissioner (IBOC) on Audit Quality (AQ), the 
study can be concluded as follows: 
1. The first hypothesis of the test results, the Managerial Ownership (OS) does not 
statistically affect on the Audit Quality (AQ). The inappropriate and insufficient 
revealing of financial reports and the lack of information transparency in 
companies increase the problems resulted from ownership isolations from the 
management. The lack of presenting the related and reliable financial information 
results in economic losses for stockholders and other external beneficiaries. 
2. From the results of testing the second hypothesis, the Independent Commissioner 
(IBOC) significantly affect on the Audit Quality (AQ). The results support the 
agency theory, that  The proportion of Commissioners from outside the company 
or independent Commissioners also affect the performance of the company acting 
as a mediator in disputes between internal managers and oversee the management 
policies as well as providing advices to the management independent. 
Commissioner is best positioned to implement the monitoring function to create a 
company that good corporate governance. 
 
Limitation of Research 
This study has limitations that can be considered for the next researcher in 
order to obtain better results. 
1. Observation period used in this study was only 3 years old, led the study results 
can not see the trend of Audit Quality that occur throughout the year. 
2. This study only uses 3 independent variables tested for their affect on Audit Quality. 
Subsequent research, the independent variable should add audit field that is not 
used in this study such as industrial classifications, and others. 
3. Nagelkerke R square value is 0.182 or 18.2%. This means that 18.2% of variation 
the Audit Quality (AQ) which can be explained by the variation of the three 
independent variable are the Managerial Ownership (OS), Independent 
Commissioner (IBOC) and Independence of audit committee (INAC), while the 
rest of 81.8% influenced by other factors that are not included in the regression 
model. 
4. Sample only from Non Financial Company thus generalization to other Industries 
is limited. 
 
Recomendation 
Based on some of the limitations that exist in this study, the researchers 
suggest for future research: 
1. The researchers could use more variables such as industry classification, internal 
audit, and others that can be used to test the Audit Quality. 
2.  Other  similar studies  can  also  be performed  to  confirm  these  results  using  a 
different test approach and or add other variables that can affect the perceived 
Audit Quality. 
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